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Election Reform in Virginia: 
Deliberation and 
Incremental Change 
Daniel]. Palazzolo, john T Whelan, 
and Elizabeth Peiffer 
Several key factors explain the incremental approach to election law after the 
2000 presidential election. The close election in Florida spurred lawmakers in 
Virginia to create the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process 
and Voting Technologies. This special subcommittee was formed to learn 
more about the capacity of election administration. Through that process, Vir-
ginia officials concluded that the election system was fundamentally sound, 
though they identified a need for additional resources to increase staff, im-
prove polling place access for disabled voters, and clean up registration rolls. 
A declining fiscal outlook limited budget resources and constrained the legis-
lature from adopting the joint subcommittee's modest recommendations for 
additional spending. Interestingly, partisan differences over the most contro-
versial issue-recounting ballots-were overcome as a result of deliberation. 
The joint subcommittee's study created a forum within which a leading Re-
publican senator changed his initial preference for how to recount ballots, and 
his view prevailed against the wishes of the Republican majority in the House 
of Delegates. Thus, in the case of Virginia, the deliberative process altered the 
policy views of a key committee leader, who in turn affected the outcome of 
the legislative process during the 2002 session. The legislature continued to 
pass incremental changes to upgrade the electoral system during 2003. 
INCREMENTAL POLICY CHANGES 
Over the three years following the 2000 election, Virginia made numerous 
changes in election law, all of which ultimately passed with overwhelming 
support from members of both parties. In the 2001 session, eighty-four bills 
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and resolutions were introduced in both the House and the Senate, and 
thirty-two passed both chambers and were signed into law (see table 7.1). 
Over half of the bills enacted into law dealt with changes in absentee voting 
and another 30 percent dealt with voter registration. The remainder of the 
bills dealt with ballot counting and requirements for registrars. Perhaps the 
three most important legislative actions in 2001 were provisions that (1) lim-
ited recounts from ballots cast by electronic devices to overvotes and under-
votes, (2) empowered the State Board of Elections to define standards for re-
counted ballots, and (3) created a joint subcommittee to study the election 
process.1 The joint subcommittee was composed of sixteen members and 
had jurisdiction to study a wide range of issues. It also formed the setting 
for legislators to learn more about an issue with which most of them were 
unfamiliar-the administrative details of election law. 
The joint subcommittee's work formed the backdrop for legislation passed 
in the 2002 session. Altogether, of the thirty-four bills introduced in 2002, 
thirteen were signed into law; six of these stemmed from the recommenda-
tions of the joint subcommittee. Most of the approved bills unrelated to the 
joint subcommittee's work tinkered with existing laws concerning absentee 
ballots, conditional voting, and record keeping. The joint subcommittee's 
recommendations were embodied in legislation dealing with the voter regis-
tration system, poll worker training, and, most importantly, rules and proce-
dures for conducting recounts. 
The legislature continued to make a variety of modest changes in election 
law during the 2003 session. Of the fifty-seven bills and resolutions intro-
duced in 2003, twenty were enacted by the General Assembly. The Assem-
bly sought to improve poll worker recruitment by allowing both paid and 
unpaid assistant registrars and election officers to work in localities where 
they are not currently registered to vote, provided they are registered to vote 
in the state of Virginia. Several changes were also made with respect to bal-
loting. For instance, a new law increased the notice of withdrawal of a party 
nominee from forty-five days to sixty days prior to the election. The purpose 
of this law was to provide sufficient time to print accurate ballots. Another 
new law allows voters who apply in person for an absentee ballot within five 
days of the election to have the ballot mailed to them. The prior law required 
the applicants to vote in person at the time they applied for the absentee bal-
lot. Voters who want to cast a conditional ballot and who are not on the 
Table 7 .1. Election Legislation in Virginia, 2001-2003 
Bills and Resolutions 2001 2002 2003 
Introduced 
Enacted 
84 
37 
51 
18 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, www.ncsl.org 
57 
20 
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precinct voter registration list must provide identification or sign a statement 
that they are the named registered voter who they claim to be. 
In the area of voter registration, the term for retaining cancelled voter reg-
istration records decreased from four to two years. Additionally, the voter 
registration lists will now be merged with the "poll book," the record of those 
who voted. The local electoral board, with the approval of the state board, 
now has the ability to modify the distance of the prohibited area around 
polling places in the case of an emergency declared by the president or the 
governor. The Assembly and the governor also abolished the National Voter 
Registration Coordinating Committee created in 1999, citing that the com-
mittee had made no recommendations to date. A few other changes in-
cluded: modifying notifications for voter registration and special elections, 
moving forward the date for the presidential primary, clarifying absentee bal-
lot instructions, and shortening the timetable for completing a recount or 
contest after a presidential election. The legislature passed a resolution en-
couraging the secretary of the Board of Elections to lead the state's planning 
efforts required to comply with the Help America Vote Act. 
As we discuss further when we review the effects of fiscal constraints and 
partisan composition on election reform, several joint subcommittee recom-
mendations failed to garner enough support to be enacted into law.2 Thus, 
in the two legislative terms following the 2000 presidential election, Virginia 
responded with incremental changes in the process of voting but stopped 
short of passing major changes in legislation that would increase opportuni-
ties for voting or make significant, qualitative improvements in the electoral 
system. In the third year, Virginia continued to make modest improvements 
in election law, some of which were directed toward satisfying the federal 
guidelines established by the HAYA, while others were reactions to requests 
and concerns of local registrars and election boards.3 
EXPLAINING ELECTION REFORM IN VIRGINIA 
Seven of the nine factors in the framework for explaining election reform 
had their intended effects: the threat of a close election, the capacity of elec-
tion law prior to the 2000 election, the fiscal situation, commission recom-
mendations, stakeholders, leadership, and external forces. Considering how 
these factors apply to Virginia, it is not surprising that the General Assembly 
took an incremental approach to election reform. We discovered that the role 
of party was mixed; the majority party was more influential in blocking pos-
sible reforms than affecting legislation that passed the General Assembly. In 
fact, preexisting partisan differences over recount rules were submerged in 
committee deliberations that caused at least one prominent Republican leg-
islator to change his viewpoint on how to conduct recounts. 
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The Threat of a Close Election 
Unlike Florida, Virginia normally votes Republican by reasonably safe 
margins in presidential elections. Though Bill Clinton lost by only 2 percent 
to Bob Dole in 1996, George Bush won the state 52 percent to 44 percent in 
2000. Virginia has experienced some close statewide elections, most recently 
in 1989 when the gubernatorial election required a recount (see Sabata 
1991). Yet this dispute was settled without litigation and Virginia generally is 
not considered a battleground in presidential politics. So, when the General 
Assembly met in 2001, the state did not face a near term threat of a Florida-
like debacle. Nonetheless, the electoral problems on display in Florida did 
prompt legislators to assess Virginia's election laws. 
The effect of Florida's election crisis on Virginia is found in two areas: (1) 
an increase in bills dealing with election administration during the 2001 leg-
islative session, and (2) the creation of a joint committee to study the elec-
toral process. The number of bills related to election law increased from 
forty-seven in 2000 (and an average of thirty-nine from 1996 to 2000) to sev-
enty-seven in 2001. The number of bills receded back to thirty-three in 2002. 
This pattern is similar to the aggregate trend for all states. According to the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, in 2001, 2,088 election reform-
related bills were introduced, compared with 1,537 in 2002 (National Con-
ference of State Legislatures 2002b). 
A second important consequence of the Florida election was the creation 
of a Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting 
Technologies. House Republican Delegate James K. "Jay" O'Brien, the pri-
mary sponsor of a resolution to conduct a study and the eventual cochair of 
the joint subcommittee, remarked: 
Florida was the driver behind the Joint Subcommittee bill. We needed to assess 
where we were. Legislators knew how to campaign and how to get elected, but 
only a few were familiar with recounts. So we needed to assess the situation be-
cause we didn't know if Virginia was as susceptible as Florida was. The idea was 
to prevent a Florida; bring in the experts and see what they knew.4 
Republican Senator Bill Bolling, the other cochair of the joint subcommittee 
also indicated that Florida was the motivating factor in creating the joint sub-
committee: "We needed to make sure Virginia could avoid the Florida deba-
cle. Florida was 'flying by the seat of its pants,' especially with respect to re-
counts. We wanted to make sure that didn't happen here."5 
Virginia was not alone in this respect. Through state-level commissions, pol-
icy makers could develop a better understanding of the election problems 
within their respective states and make recommendations about how to im-
prove elections. We will return to the effect of the joint subcommittee on elec-
tion law legislation later in the chapter. At this point, it is worth recognizing 
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that the close election in Florida and the ensuing problems unmasked in the 
process of trying to find a winner prompted Virginia to take a careful look at 
the status of its electoral systems. 
Capacity of Election Law 
Though Virginia's election system is far from perfect, its election laws and 
practices were better than those of most other states. Prior to the 2000 elec-
tion, Virginia was one of only a dozen states that made available provisional 
ballots for voters whose names did not appear on the registration rolls (elec-
tionline.org and the Constitution Project 2001b, 5). Although the Virginia reg-
istration system needed to be updated, Virginia was one of the first states to 
have a statewide database and one of only ten states to have a unified data-
base shared by state and local governments. In terms of voting technology, 
Virginia counties use the five standard types of equipment. The largest per-
centage of counties use lever systems (43 percent), followed by punch cards 
(20.4), electronic 09.6), optical scan (16.9), and paper ballots (.1) (An-
solabehere and Stewart 2002). It is important to recognize that Virginia had 
recently made several legislative and administrative improvements in its 
electoral system in response to a 1999 study by the Joint Legislative and Au-
dit Review Commission QLARC). The JLARC found that the equipment for 
maintaining records in the registration system was outdated, the "motor 
voter" law had created challenges for administering voter registration, and 
the State Board of Elections was suffering from poor management Qoint Leg-
islative and Audit Review Commission 1999; see also Whitley 1999). Several 
improvements in election administration followed from the JLARC report. 
The Assembly passed legislation to address several of JLARC's recommenda-
tions and relations between the State Board and the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles improved under Cameron Quinn, who was appointed secretary of the 
State Board of Elections (SBE) in January 1999.6 
After the Joint Subcommittee on Election Process and Voting Technologies 
completed its work, its report reached the following conclusion: "The Joint 
Subcommittee heard numerous comments pointing to existing laws and 
practices in Virginia that are being touted on the national scene as steps to 
improve elections and avoid the problems that plagued Florida and other 
states in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election. It is worth noting that 
a number of these assets are already in place in Virginia's election process" 
(Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and 
Voting Technologies 2002, 3). Specifically, the report highlighted Virginia's 
centralized statewide registration system, provisional or conditional ballots, 
and recount procedures and standards. These fundamental attributes of the 
system may explain why Virginia's residual vote rate (1.91 percent) was be-
low the national rate (1.94 percent) (Edley et al. 2002).7 
Virginia 113 
The prevailing status of election administration certainly affected the in-
cremental pace of election reform in Virginia. With provisional balloting, a 
statewide registration database, effective administrative leadership at the 
SBE, and ongoing improvements in registration procedures all in place 
prior to the 2000 election, most felt there was little need for major reform 
in election administration. Our interviews with the cochairs of the joint 
committee-House Delegate O'Brien and Senator Bolling-affirmed that 
view. Both legislators began the process with the aim of learning the de-
gree to which Virginia needed to improve the electoral system, and both 
came away with confidence that the fundamentals were in place. Particu-
larly compared with other states, Virginia did not have very much to do in 
the area of election administration, short of providing additional funds to 
improve the existing system or advancing the partisan priorities of Demo-
cratic legislators, such as restoring the right to vote for felons who had 
completed their sentences.8 These goals were curtailed by budget con-
straints and partisan considerations. 
Fiscal Conditions 
Virginia's fiscal situation contributed to the incremental pace of reform. As 
the General Assembly began to meet in 2001, Virginia was one of eleven 
states that forecasted revenue shortfalls (National Conference of State Legis-
latures 2002a). The situation worsened throughout 2001 and 2002, placing 
constraints on any programs that required new funding, including proposals 
to improve the electoral system. In the 2001 session, the governor's budget 
included new funds to upgrade the statewide voter registration system. But 
the Assembly and the governor reached a stalemate over how to balance the 
budget and new funding never materialized. In the 2002 session, Delegate 
O'Brien offered noncontroversial budget amendments stemming from the 
joint subcommittee report that sought funds for upgrades in the statewide 
registration system, a full-time staff position for the State Board of Elections, 
and grants to localities to improve poll place accessibility for disabled peo-
ple. None of these proposals made it through the Appropriations Committee. 
State Board of Elections Secretary Quinn summarized the situation: "In 2001 
there was no budget; and in 2002 there was no money."9 
The tight fiscal situation loomed over the joint subcommittee's delibera-
tions in the fall of 2001. According to Professor Larry Sabato of the Univer-
sity of Virginia, a citizen appointee to the joint subcommittee, each time an 
idea came forward that required funding the legislators would say, "That is a 
good idea but of course we don't have the money."10 In spite of O'Brien's 
interest i~ sp~nding m;re to strengthen the system, when asked if he 
planned to offer any amendments during the 2003 session, he said: "No. I 
would if they had a chance of passing, but there is no chance."u 
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Spending on election administration, like any other government function, 
depends on the degree to which legislators view it as a priority. Resources 
are always scarce. Yet other factors in the framework, such as the capacity of 
a state to administer elections and the prospect of having a close election, 
might cause the state to spend more on elections, regardless of what Con-
gress decides to do or how much funding is available. The problems with 
election law and the close election in Florida made election reform a prior-
ity in that state, in spite of concerns about the budgetary situation. But in Vir-
ginia, where the electoral system seemed to be in good order and the state 
legislature was cutting back spending in existing programs, new funds for 
elections were considered a luxury rather than a necessity. 
Party Control 
Party control varied in the two legislative terms that followed the 2000 
election. For the first time in history Republicans gained majority control of 
the Senate in 1998 and the House of Delegates in 2000. Thus, during the 2001 
legislative session, Republicans held both chambers and the governor's of-
fice. After the 2001 elections, Democratic Governor Mark Warner replaced 
outgoing Republican Governor Jim Gilmore. According to our interviews, 
neither governor considered election reform to be a priority. Within the leg-
islature, Republican-sponsored bills on elections succeeded at a higher rate 
than Democrat-sponsored bills. During the 2001 session, 20 percent of 
Democratic-sponsored bills and 40 percent of Republican-sponsored bills 
passed both houses; in the 2002 session only 12 percent of Democratic-spon-
sored bills compared with 65 percent of Republican-sponsored bills passed 
both houses; and in the 2003 session 27 percent of Democratic-sponsored 
bills compared with 36 percent of Republican-sponsored bills passed both 
houses. However, all of the bills passed by the Assembly received bipartisan 
support on final passage and most bills were approved with unanimous 
support in both houses. 
The effect of Republican control is seen most on bills sponsored by Dem-
ocrats that tried to remove barriers to voting or that advantaged potentially 
Democratic voting constituencies. Attempts by Democratic members to pass 
legislation allowing for "no excuse" early voting and restoring the voting 
rights of convicted felons who served their sentences never emerged from 
committee. 
Partisan considerations also came into play in the creation of the joint sub-
committee. The joint subcommittee's sixteen members consisted of six 
House members and four Senators, and six nonlegislators (a local electoral 
board member, a voter registrar, two citizen members, and the Secretary of 
the State Board of Elections and the Secretary of Technology, or their de-
signees). Reflecting their historic ascendancy to majority status, Republicans 
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controlled the joint subcommittee and former Speaker of the House S. Vance 
Wilkins Jr. played a key role in its makeup. The Republican speaker made 
his presence felt, appointing all six House members (four Republicans and 
two Democrats), the local electoral board member, and a citizen member, 
and selecting as chair one of his close allies. Even the Democratic citizen 
member, Anthony F. Troy, a former Democratic attorney general and one of 
the state's leading lobbyists, had close ties to the speaker. 12 Altogether Re-
publicans constituted ten of the sixteen subcommittee members, controlling 
for the first time a major legislative inquiry into the state's electoral process. 
Yet, while Republicans held control over the joint subcommittee and suc-
ceeded in keeping certain Democratic initiatives from passing in the legisla-
tive process, they were not able to change the law for recounting ballots. Un-
der existing state law, recount procedures must follow the "intent of the 
voter." Ultimately, the "Republican" position on recount legislation was de-
feated, largely because Republican Senator Bolling, cochair of the joint sub-
committee, changed his position after learning more about the foibles of 
overvotes and undervotes. Thus, the joint subcommittee played a key role in 
mitigating the potential effects of Republican control. 
Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process 
and Voting Technologies 
Virginia's version of a commission was the Joint Subcommittee Studying 
Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies. The joint subcommittee 
was created for two reasons: the need for information about the status of 
electoral systems (as noted above) and workload considerations. Like other 
studies conducted by ad hoc bodies, this subcommittee did not conduct its 
work during the session. The Assembly, operating under one of the shortest 
meeting schedules in the country, with sessions normally lasting forty-six 
calendar days in the odd-numbered years and sixty in the even-numbered 
years, conducts such studies during the interim period.13 In addition, the 
2001 session, meeting in the second year of the biennium, faced a heavy 
agenda that included crafting a plan to balance the deteriorating budget. 
The joint subcommittee was given a wide-ranging jurisdiction: fifteen spe-
cific charges and a final open-ended directive to "make any other recom-
mendations for changes that may be desirable to advance the certainty of, 
and fairness in establishing, the outcome of elections in the Commonwealth" 
(Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Election Process and 
Voting Technologies 2002, 4). 14 The joint subcommittee also had been di-
rected to consider the studies of commissions appointed in other states. 
Therefore, the joint subcommittee was in position to serve as the primary 
deliberative body on an issue about which very few legislators could claim 
expertise. Delegate O'Brien noted: "Unless a member had been involved in a 
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close election that involved a recount, they had no reason to be experts in 
election law."15 Dividing itself into two task forces, one on technology and 
voting equipment, the other on voter registration and election-day processes, 
the subcommittee and its task forces held twelve meetings from mid-May to 
late November 2001.16 The subcommittee solicited information from a wide 
range of groups and heard from state and national figures involved with elec-
tion reform. In all, more than eighty persons met with the subcommittee to in-
form them of state and national electoral developments in the wake of 
Florida. Ultimately, the most influential information reviewed by the joint 
subcommittee came from two members: Secretary of the State Board of Elec-
tions Cameron Quinn and University of Virginia political scientist Larry 
Sabata. Quinn's staff prepared various illustrations of strangely marked, set-
aside ballots from around the state of Virginia and Sabata brought examples 
from Florida. Though the ballots could not be read by machine, they clearly 
showed voter intent in a variety of ways. Some ballots had arrows pointing to 
the candidate the voter preferred, others crossed out one candidate and cir-
cled the other, and another had a note that read "I want Bush."17 
As it turned out, the ballots had the effect of changing the perspective of 
Senator Bolling and the effect carried over into the legislative process during 
the 2002 session.18 Before the joint subcommittee's study Bolling held the 
mainstream Republican position with respect to counting ballots, which held 
that only properly cast, machine-readable ballots should count. After seeing 
the ballots provided by Quinn and Sabata, Bolling learned that "the capabil-
ity of voters to cast a ballot varies greatly. Voters come in all shapes and sizes . 
. . . By looking at the actual ballots from Florida, you could see examples in 
which the ballot was cast improperly, but the voter's intent was clear. "19 He 
noted examples such as arrows pointing to the candidate and, with optical 
scan ballots, where the bubble was circled rather than filled in. 
Surprisingly, the Republican-leaning joint subcommittee recommended 
that voter intent in recounts be considered under certain conditions. The 
proposed law required that, when possible, mechanical ballot counters for 
optical scan and punch card systems be programmed to set aside ballots con-
taining overvotes and undervotes. The set-aside ballots then would be man-
ually counted (Report of the Joint Subcommittee 2002, 17 and C-6). The sub-
committee approved the proposal by a close 8 to 6 vote (Whitley 2001). As 
expressions of opposition, Delegate O'Brien filed an "exception" to the re-
port and the local Republican electoral board member Edward A. O'Neal 
wrote a "dissenting opinion" (Report of the Joint Subcommittee 2002, 19-21). 
Espousing a conventional Republican view, both O'Brien and O'Neal felt it 
was the responsibility of the voter to ensure that the ballot be cast correctly. 
The proposed procedures, said O'Neal, opens the process to "the potential 
for honest human error and for partisan manipulation" (Report of the Joint 
Subcommittee 2002, 21). O'Brien pointed out that the problem with hand re-
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counts is that the intent of the voter is often decided by biased judges, 
thereby defeating the purpose of truly determining the voter's intent. 20 
During the 2002 session, the Republican-dominated House Privileges and 
Elections Committee voted 12-7, largely along party lines, to adopt recount 
procedures that excluded ballots containing overvotes or undervotes. The 
full House, again voting along partisan lines, endorsed the committee's rec-
ommendation (Whitley 2002).21 In contrast, the Senate, led by Bolling, em-
braced the joint subcommittee's recommendation of considering voter intent 
in overvotes and undervotes. When the issue went to conference, Bolling's 
position prevailed, mainly because he stood his ground and his position ad-
hered to existing law. In order for O'Brien to prevail, both chambers would 
have needed to change statutory precedent with respect to recount proce-
dure. Bolling said he was not about to let that happen. He indicated: "I was 
not going to sign off on a bill without these protections. "22 
Leadership 
Bolling's leadership coincided with the overall approach to election re-
form in Virginia-improve the system incrementally. Neither Bolling nor 
O'Brien had the interest or the power to advance major structural changes 
and Virginia lacked strong executive leadership for major election reform. 
The secretary of the State Board of Elections is appointed by the governor 
and has almost no formal authority to regulate elections. Moreover, neither 
Governor Gilmore, nor Governor Warner made election reform a major pri-
ority. The joint subcommittee was created by the legislature to make recom-
mendations to the legislature. Thus, leadership fell to the cochairs of the joint 
subcommittee, Senator Bolling and Delegate O'Brien. As noted above, nei-
ther of them thought that the electoral system needed major change. The in-
cremental results of the legislature reflected their assessment of the prob-
lems. Bolling, of course, played a key leadership role in terms of advancing 
the recount provisions. As Quinn pointed out, Bolling "was the reason the 
voter intent position prevailed."23 Yet, leadership for major change was ab-
sent from the process. 
Stakeholders 
The views of interested groups and election officials were funneled 
through the joint subcommittee. We did not find any evidence of significant 
interest group activity either in favor of or against election reform. Cameron 
Quinn, secretary of the State Board of Education, noted that the joint sub-
committee made a concerted effort "to reach out" to relevant Virginia groups, 
hearing from the NAACP, League of Women Voters, Common Cause, Electoral 
Board Association, Voter Registrars Association, and the Virginia Municipal 
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League. Consistent with the view that Virginia's election system was generally 
sound, Quinn noted that none of these groups testified that the system was 
experiencing grave problems. 24 
External Forces 
The prospect of federal legislation, the September 11 terrorist attacks, and 
the passage of the HAVA also affected the incremental pace of election re-
form in Virginia. Congress began serious discussion of election reform legis-
lation in 2001, just as states were meeting to consider possible reforms. In 
December 2001, the House of Representatives passed a bill including $2.65 
billion to replace equipment and administer elections. Sabata indicated that 
as the members of the joint subcommittee were meeting in the fall 2001, they 
"didn't know what Congress would do."25 It made sense for legislators to 
wait until they knew how much the federal government was going to spend 
on election reform, and how the states would be expected to spend it, be-
fore using state resources. 
The September 11 terrorist attacks affected the agenda of election reform 
in two ways. First of all, the attacks reduced the urgency of election reform. 
Several members of the joint subcommittee remarked that at the study's out-
set concern about the state of the Virginia electoral process was one of the 
"hottest issues." Yet, by the time the joint subcommittee would finish its in-
quiry, recalled Delegate O'Brien, "9/11 blew it off the radar."26 As Sabata 
noted, "A legislature can only handle so many issues, and after 9/11, impor-
tant as it may be, election administration seemed much less important."27 At 
the least, September 11 contributed to prevailing forces that foretold an in-
cremental approach to election reform. Secondly, September 11 had a spe-
cific effect on the recommendations of the joint subcommittee. As a result of 
September 11, joint subcommittee members began to question what would 
happen if an attack occurred on election day, disrupting or perhaps even 
postponing the election. The joint subcommittee drafted an amendment to 
the Virginia Constitution that authorized the General Assembly to postpone 
an election in the case of a military attack or natural disaster. 
After Congress passed the Help America Vote Act that authorized $3.86 bil-
lion for states to improve their electoral systems, Senator O'Brien (formerly 
Delegate O'Brien) introduced a resolution that "encourages the Secretary of 
the State Board of Elections to lead Virginia's efforts to meet the requirements 
of the Help America Vote Act and obtain funds available through the Act for 
improving the voter registration and election process, including the develop-
ment of a state plan for use of funds to improve voter registration procedures 
and the conduct of elections."28 The Senate approved the resolution during 
the 2003 session. The HAVA plan calls for a balanced approach to spending 
$64.1 million in expected federal funds. About half the funds will go toward 
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replacing punch cards, 20 percent will be used to upgrade the voter registra-
tion database, and another 20 percent will be committed for voter education 
programs. We expect the General Assembly to approve recommendations of 
the HAVA Planning Committee that require legislative action. 
In addition to bringing new resources to the state, the HAVA reinvigorated 
efforts to improve administrative coordination and oversight in the election 
system. The administrative structure in Virginia is a hybrid of centralized and 
decentralized elements. The state reimburses localities for a some of the 
costs, but does not pay the total costs or leave localities on their own; it pro-
vides voluntary training of election officials, but does not mandate training; 
and it requires localities to purchase machines that have been tested and ap-
proved, but does not buy the machines. Moreover, the powers of the state 
board vis a vis local boards are limited (electionline.org and the Constitution 
Project 2002c, 10). Cameron Quinn, the secretary of the State Board of Elec-
tions in 2001, hoped that the joint subcommittee would recommend changes 
that were needed to improve coordination between the SBE, election regis-
trars, and local election boards, develop more accountable procedures for 
managing voter registration information, and enable the state agency to man-
age resources more efficiently.29 However, the joint subcommittee ended its 
work before delving deeply into the arcane details of administrative over-
sight and coordination. HAVA created another vehicle for bringing those is-
sues to the forefront. After Congress passed the HAVA, some of the concerns 
of election administrators were dealt with during the 2003 legislative session. 
While the HAVA did not have major effect on Virginia's election laws, the 
passage of the HAVA gave election officials a vehicle for advancing their rec-
ommendations for clarifying and correcting a host of problems with election 
laws. Some of those changes were bundled together in Senate Bill 1107 and 
passed easily in both houses.30 
CONCLUSION 
The threat of a close election, the capacity of election law, fiscal constraints, 
commission recommendations, stakeholders, leadership, and external fac-
tors explain why Virginia took an incremental approach to election reform. 
Party control had a mixed effect on reform efforts. Interestingly, the joint 
subcommittee created the platform for deliberation over the issue of whether 
voter intent should be considered in recounts and the subcommittee's rec-
ommendation prevailed over the partisan preferences of the majority party 
in the House. In this case, an influential committee leader changed his initial 
preferences and ultimately shaped the final terms of the legislation. 
The study enables us to specify the effects and sequence of key variables 
that affected legislative outcomes. The main effect of the Florida election was 
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to draw attention to election administration and cause legislators to explore 
the potential problems with the system. Thus, Florida was a "wake up call" to 
legislators in Virginia and other states that set up commissions. The capacity 
of election law was a key factor in explaining why policymakers adopted in-
cremental changes rather than major reforms. Fiscal conditions also affected 
the prospects of reform. The combination of a relatively positive report about 
the current system from the joint subcommittee and a fiscal situation that 
called for spending cuts to balance the budget constrained policymakers 
from seeking major upgrades in the voting system. Party control was less 
significant. The Republicans succeeded in blocking certain Democratic-
sponsored bills from becoming law, and perhaps those reforms would be 
more likely to advance if Democrats held a majority in the legislature. But the 
inability to change recount rules to reflect the "Republican" position demon-
strated the limits of majority party control. The joint subcommittee's work re-
vealed the importance of deliberation on election reform. Unlike issues that 
are familiar to state legislators-for example, budget, social policy, education, 
or crime-election administration is a relatively obscure policy area. Legisla-
tors certainly know how to campaign for office, but unless they had encoun-
tered a recount or other poll-related problems, they would not be as familiar 
with the details of election law. Thus, individual policy preferences on election-
related issues were not well formulated or firmly held. Under those condi-
tions, deliberation can inform or even alter legislative preferences.31 
NOTES 
1 See House Bill 1843 and Senate Bill 363 (Virginia General Assembly, Legislative 
Information System, http://legis.state.va.us/). 
2. These amendments included: $200,000 for the State Board of Elections to award 
grants to localities for efforts to increase accessibility to the polls, especially for dis-
abled citizens; funds to create a full time staff position for the State Board of Elections 
with responsibility for overseeing the certification of voting equipment, monitoring 
developments in voting technologies, and administering the distribution of grants to 
localities ($344,819, plus $10,525 yearly recurring costs to modify the Division of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV) voter registration process to allow for print-on-demand voter 
applications); and $40,000 to secure and use social security deceased lists to help 
purge the names of deceased persons from the state registered voter list. 
3. Interview with Rosanna Bencoach, agency management analyst, Virginia State 
Board of Elections, June 13, 2003. This point is developed further along in the chap-
ter in the section on external forces. 
4. Interview with Delegate O'Brien, May 31, 2002. 
5. Interview with Senator Bolling, May 29, 2002. 
6. The Assembly's legislation had the following provisions: created a Coordinating 
Committee to oversee the National Voter Registration Act; gave the State Board of Elec-
tions (SBE) the responsibility to train election officials; allowed for transfer of registra-
Virginia 121 
tion data from the State Board of Elections, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), 
and the general registrars; provided funds for personal computers and desktop print-
ers to all 135 general registrars; required electronic linkage between the SBE and the 
Virginia State Police so that information regarding felons could be easily transferred. 
On its own initiative, the SBE took the following steps in response to JLARC's recom-
mendations: established a linkage with the Virginia State Board of Health to allow for 
accurate and timely removal of deceased people from registration rolls; conducted a 
review and certification of new voting equipment; encouraged localities that are in 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act to opt for "bail out" status, which relieves them 
of some of the cumbersome federal requirements. The DMV developed a training 
manual for its employees; improved procedures for notifying people that they may 
register at DMV; and revised the registration application form to reduce the amount of 
error in filling out and processing the application. Finally, SBE and DMV worked to-
gether to create a system for allowing people to verify that they are registered to vote 
(Joint Legislative and Audit Review Commission 2001). 
7. Policy makers and commission members seemed to overlook the fact that the 
residual vote rate varied across the counties for the 2000 election. Of the fifty-seven 
Virginia counties above the state average, twenty-eight had rates between 2.01 and 3 
percent, twenty-one had rates between 3.01 and 5.49 percent, and eight had rates be-
tween 5.S and 10 percent. 
8. It is important to note that continued improvements can be sought after and 
may ultimately be achieved through further incremental steps. The joint subcommit-
tee report indicated a need for a "continuing process of review and evaluation of 
Virginia's voter registration and election processes" (Report of the Joint Subcommit-
tee Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies 2002). And Cameron 
Quinn, the secretary of the State Board of Elections, pointed to changes she believed 
needed to be made in the administrative structure (interview with State Board of Elec-
tions Secretary, Cameron Quinn, June 21, 2002). But these would be improvements 
on a system that is fundamentally sound. 
9. Interview with Secretary Quinn. 
10. Interview with Professor Larry Sabato, University of Virginia, citizen represen-
tative on the joint subcommittee, June 3, 2002. 
11. Interview with Delegate O'Brien. 
12. Troy represented Wilkins in a land dispute case that was eventually settled by 
the Virginia Supreme Court in 2001. The speaker later retained Troy to defend him in 
a sexual harassment case that led to the speaker's forced resignation. For these and 
other Wilkins-Troy connections, see, for example, Schapiro 2002, B2. 
13. According to the NCSL, the national average for session length is approximately 
120 calendar days per year (National Conference of State Legislatures 2000, 19). 
14. The jurisdiction and legislative mandate of the Joint Committee on Elections 
was established in House Joint Resolution 681. The resolution 
Establishes a joint subcommittee to study the election process. In conducting the study, the 
joint subcommittee shall (i) examine the reliability and performance of the various types 
of voting systems in use throughout Virginia and in other states; (ii) examine the feasibil-
ity, advisability and costs of standardizing voting systems throughout the Commonwealth; 
(iii) consider ways to encourage localities to purchase or phase-in upgraded voting sys-
tems, including match grant programs; (iv) examine new and developing technologies that 
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might advance the goals of better determining vote eligibility, ensuring voter privacy, en-
hancing the ability of voters to cast accurate and legal ballots and reducing the potential 
for election officials and individual interests to seek to interpret the intent of voters from 
ballots cast; (v) establish the extent to which, and the circumstances under which, spoiled 
ballots are cast or rescinded in elections; (vi) collect information regarding possible or ac-
tual voter misunderstanding of the ballot in elections throughout the Commonwealth; (vii) 
solicit the advice and experience of local electoral boards in ascertaining, establishing, and 
certifying the results of elections for accuracy and fairness; (viii) investigate the extent of 
and legality of vote-swapping strategies; (ix) examine local electoral board membership 
and qualification; (x) consider procedures for voter-friendly registration; (xi) examine stan-
dard procedures for assisting voters at the polls; (xii) ascertain the training needs of elec-
tion officials and monitor the study by the State Board of Elections and the Weldon Cooper 
Center for Public Service on establishing a career development program for voter regis-
trars; (xiii) consider procedures for standardizing absentee voting; (xiv) examine legal, 
technological, logistical and other related issues, including privacy involved in the han-
dling and security of a merged pollbook; (xv) investigate the experience of, and monitor 
current actions in, other states; and (xvi) make any other recommendations for changes 
that may be desirable to advance the certainty of, and fairness in establishing, the outcome 
of elections in the Commonwealth. The aforementioned objectives represent the incorpo-
ration of HJR 529, HJR 621, HJR 659, HJR 798, SJR 352 and SJR 376. This resolution is iden-
tical to S)R 363. 
Source: http://legis.state.va.us. 
15. Interview with Delegate O'Brien. 
16. See "Work of the Joint Subcommittee," in the Report of the Joint Subcommittee 
Studying Virginia's Election Process and Voting Technologies, 2-3. A record of 
the joint subcommittee's meetings can be found at http://dls.state.va.us/pubs/Iegisrec/ 
2001/hjr681a.htm. 
17. Interviews with Professor Sabata and Secretary Quinn. 
18. The following account is from an interview with Senator Bolling. 
19. Interview with Senator Bolling. 
20. Interview with Delegate O'Brien. 
21. For a record of the committee and floor action on HB985, see http://legl.state 
.va.us/Iegp504.exe?021 +ful+HB985E. 
22. Interview with Senator Bolling. 
23. Interview with Secretary Quinn. 
24. Interview with Secretary Quinn. 
25. Interview with Professor Sabata. 
26. Interview with Delegate O'Brien. 
27. Interview with Professor Sabata. 
28. SJ350, see http://legis.state.va.us/. 
29. Interview with Secretary Quinn. 
30. Interview with Bencoach. For more details on these changes, see Resume of 
Changes to Virginia Election Laws, 2003 Regular Session, State Board of Elections 
(available upon request). The full text of all legislative changes to the Code of Elec-
tions can be found at http://legl.state.va.us/ 
31. For theoretical treatment on the role of the legislature as a deliberative body, 
see Bessette 1997. 
